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ABSTRACT
This paper offers some econometric evidence on the sources of slow growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The
evidence suggests that the continent’s slow growth can be explained in an international cross-country
framework, without the need to invoke a special explanation unique to Sub-Saharan Africa.  We find that
poor economic policies have played an especially important role in the slow growth, most importantly
Africa’s lack of openness to international markets.  In addition, geographical factors such as lack of access to
the sea and tropical climate have also contributed to Africa’s slow growth. 
-------------------
This is a substantially revised version of “Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies”,
Development Discussion Paper No. 545, Harvard Institute for International Development, July
1996.  We thank Malcolm McPherson, Steven Radelet, and Michael Roemer for helpful
discussions. 
2 When we refer to Africa in this paper we always mean sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).1
This paper offers some calculations on the sources of slow economic growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) during the period 1965-1990, based on a cross-country regression model 
developed in Sachs and Warner (1995a,1995b,1997).   Many African specialists emphasize
Africa’s colonial history, its ethnic and tribal divisions, and its climate and geography in explaining
Africa’s slow growth during the past 30 years.  Th  findings in this paper do not directly1
contradict these views, but they highlight several facts that are not generally known.  Most
importantly, the growth (or lack thereof) in SSA during 1965-90 can be accounted for within a
cross-country regression model that covers a wide range of developing and developed countries in
all parts of the world.  Specifically, Africa’s slow growth can be explained according to the same
variables (e.g. measuring economic policy, initial conditions, demography, and physical
geography) that account well for the growth performance of other parts of the developing world. 
There is no need for a special “Africa” theory, at least with regard to proximate causes of
economic growth.  
Our findings do not mean that Africa’s colonial legacy, ethnic divisions, or particular
geographical difficulties are unimportant.  The colonial legacy or ethnic divisions, for example,
may help to explain Africa’s poor choices of economic policy, which in turn are responsible for
much of the growth shortfall according to our regression estimates.  Similarly, Africa’s distinctive
geography -- with a substantial population in landlocked countries, and a very high proportion of
land in tropical climates -- surely have contributed to the poor economic outcomes in Africa, but
in ways that are consistent with the effects of geography evident in other parts of the world.  At
the same time, however, our estimates support a more optimist view about Africa’s future than is
sometimes expressed, because the quantitative results suggest that poor policies and institutions
explain a large share of the slow growth, and that better policies would contribute to stronger
3 Hong Kong, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.2
economic performance.  Africa’s physical geography, difficult as it is, does not pose an
insurmountable challenge to faster growth, even if it will tend to diminish growth rates compared
to some other parts of the developing world.  We also note that where strong economic reforms
have actually been implemented in SSA, the result has been rapid economic growth.
Table 1 shows some basic facts about Sub-Saharan Africa, and compares Africa with the
rest of the developing world.  African growth (measured as the annual average change in GDP per
capita) averaged just 0.8 percent per year over the 25 year period 1965-1990.  By contrast,
growth in the seven fastest-growing developing countries outside of Africa averaged 5.8 percent,2
and growth in the rest of the developing world averaged 1.8 percent.  As a result of slow growth,
African countries today are vastly poorer than the rest of the developing world.  Back in 1965,
GDP per-capita in sub-Saharan Africa was 60 percent of the average of the rest of the developing
world  (Table 1, 2nd row).  By 1990, this figure had fallen to 35 percent.  There is now
considerable international evidence that poorer developing countries that followed market-
oriented policies in the past 30 years did indeed grow faster and thus catch-up to the richer
countries.   The cross-country growth analysis that follows addresses the question of why such
“convergent” growth did not occur in Africa.    
I. Data used to explain growth. 
Table 1 shows other basic variables that we have found to be helpful in explaining cross-
country growth in recent decades.  The theoretical underpinning for our choice of variables is
explained in the next section.  In general the variables are those that we, along with other authors,
have previously found to be related to cross-country growth, i.e. Sachs and Warner(1995a,
1995b, 1997).  Table 1 compares mean values for Africa with two other groups of developing
economies: the seven fast-growing developing economies and all other developing countries.  To
4summarize, Africa has performed worse than other developing countries on the following
economic policy variables: openness to international trade; average annual inflation; and national
saving rates.  Africa performed worse that the fast-growing economies but about the same (or
better) than other developing countries on two other variables: central government saving and
qualitative measures of institutional quality (as judged by businessmen respondents in a 1980
survey).  Africa also possibly had natural disadvantages in the following: a larger fraction of
landlocked countries, a higher fraction of area in tropical latitudes (with implications for disease,
soil quality, and other climatic factors); higher dependence on natural resources, and greater
ethno-linguistic fractionalization.   Life expectancy in the initial period was also lower in Africa,
probably due to a combination of lower income, poorer public health institutions and
climatological factors that make the continent more susceptible to endemic infectious disease. 
Finally, Africa differs from other developing countries in that it has not proceeded far in the
demographic transition to reduced fertility and reduced mortality, so that the growth of the young
dependent population (15 years and under) outstripped the growth of the overall population.  We
now define some of these variables in more detail and later turn to regression analysis to examine
the possible role of these variables in accounting for Africa’s slower growth. 
For each country we measure real gross domestic product per person, and also real gross
domestic product per working-age person.  The working-age population is defined as the
population between the ages of 15 and 64.  Real GDP is measured in constant dollar prices that
are common across countries (the source is the Penn World Tables data described in Summers
and Heston, 1991).  Economic growth is measured as the average annual change in the natural
logarithm of GDP per person between the years 1965 and 1990. When we use initial GDP in the
regressions, we refer to real GDP per person in 1965.
The openness variable measures the proportion of years within the interval 1965-1990 in
5which an economy is open to international trade by the criteria in Sachs and Warner (1995).  An
economy is deemed to be open to trade if it satisfies five tests: (1) average tariff rates below 40
percent; (2) average quota and licensing coverage of imports of less than 40 percent; (3) a black
market exchange rate premium of less than 20 percent; and (4) no extreme controls (taxes,
quotas, state monopolies) on exports; and (5) not considered a socialist country by the standard in
Kornai (1992).  Our earlier work, Sachs and Warner (1995a), as well as Sala-I-Martin (1997),
and Edwards (1997) finds that this measure of openness is positively related to growth.
We also examine whether a country's geography affects growth.  Countries that are
geographically isolated from world markets will face higher costs for all international activities,
and may end up with a lower division of labor and lower output per capita. Landlocked countries,
in particular, face very high costs of shipping, since they must pay road transport costs across at
least one international boundary in addition to sea freight costs.  Although air shipments can help
overcome many of these problems, only certain goods can be economically shipped by air, and
most countries still import and export the majority of goods by the sea.  We attempt to capture
some of the disadvantages from being landlocked with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
all economies that do not border international waters.  Table 1 shows that about a third of all sub-
Saharan African countries are landlocked, compared to none of the fast-growing countries and
only about eleven percent of rest of the developing world.  Therefore, the impact of this variable
on growth is potentially important for African countries. 
Africa also has a high proportion of the population in tropical climates.  Casual
observation suggests that countries located in the tropics tend to grow more slowly than countries
in more temperate climates.  At least two channels for this negative relationship seem likely.  First,
tropical countries face a wide variety of parasitic diseases that are much less prevalent in the
temperate zones, and disease is one of the sources of low labor productivity.  Second, soils tend
6to be more fragile, rains less reliable, pests and veterinary disease more prevalent, and natural
disasters more frequent, all of which impede sustained agricultural growth in the tropics.  Tropical
climate is measured by a variable that takes the value 1 for a country in which the entire land area
is subject to a tropical climate, and 0 for a country with no land area subject to a tropical climate. 
Countries in between these two extremes are assigned a fraction representing the approximate
proportion of land area subject to a tropical climate.  
Central government saving is measured as current revenues minus current expenditures of
the central government, expressed as a fraction of GDP.  Variation in national saving rates across
countries are a potentially important source of variation in growth rates, and national saving is by
definition equal to the sum of private saving and government saving.  As is well known (Barro
1994) the impact of an increase in government savings on national saving depends on the extent
to which there is an offsetting decline in private saving.  Recent empirical work in Edwards
(1996) supports the idea that a rise in government saving raises national saving, but by less than
one-for-one, so there is some offset but it is not complete. It should be mentioned however, that
for lack of alternative data, our variable measures central government saving and as such misses
public saving that comes from local governments, public enterprises or off-budget entities.  Data
for saving of the consolidated public sector is not available for a sufficient number of countries to
be used in our regressions.  Africa’s mean of about 4 percent of GDP in Table 1 is sensitive to the
influence of Botswana and Gabon, both of which have had quite high rates of government
savings. 
The national saving rate is measured as nominal saving divided by nominal GDP.  It is
obviously not a policy variable itself, but is rather the reflection of policy variables, tastes, market
institutions, and so forth.  The national saving rate is heavily influenced by the government saving
rate, the nature of the public retirement system (pay-as-you-go systems tend to produce lower
7 The index is constructed by the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector3
(IRIS) from data printed in the International Country Risk Guide, published by Political Risk
Services.
private saving rates than mandatory individualized systems as in Malaysia and Singapore), and
demographic variables. 
We also use a general measure of institutional quality to help explain cross-country
growth. This follows previous research by Keefer and Knack (1994) and Barro (1996).  The
institutional quality index is an average of 5 sub-indexes developed from data by Political Risk
Services, measuring the following.  The rule of law index  “reflects the degree to which the3
citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws
and adjudicate disputes” The bureaucratic quality index m asures “autonomy from political
pressure”, and “strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions
in government services.”  The corruption in government index measures whether “illegal
payments are generally expected throughout .. government”, in the form of “bribes connected
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans.” 
The risk of expropriation index m asures high risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced
nationalization.” The government repudiation of contracts index measures the “risk of a
modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement or scaling down.”  
These five sub-indexes are scaled and averaged together into our overall institutional quality
index.  We don’t use these indexes separately because the country scores on the various sub-
indexes tend to be highly correlated.  As a result, the data do not permit a sharp distinction
between these five elements of institutional quality. 
Natural resource abundance is included as a determinant of growth following the research
in Sachs and Warner (1995b).  Our variable measures the ratio of natural resource exports to
8GDP in 1970. Natural resource exports are defined as the sum of exports of primary agriculture,
fuels and minerals.  
Other variables include inflation, measured as the annual percentage growth in the GDP
deflator, and life expectancy at birth (LEB), measured in years.  The LEB is a broad indicator of
the health of the population, which has been shown in earlier research to be a significant predictor
of future economic growth.  Presumably a low LEB reflects the economic costs of high infant
mortality, high morbidity in the population, and a shorter time horizon for the accumulation of
human capital.
We also measure growth of neighboring countries.  This was derived as follows.  We first
summed GDP, measured in purchasing-power-adjusted dollars, and population of all countries
that border a given country, and computed GDP per-capita for this aggregation of countries. 
Standard growth rates were then calculated for this aggregation between 1970 and 1989.  This
variables offers a way to test for the extent of neighborhood effects on growth. 
The measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization is taken from related work by Mauro
(1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997).  The variable measures the probability (between 0 and
100) that two randomly-selected people from a country will n t belong to the same ethnic or
linguistic group. Tanzania has the highest value at 93, and Korea has the lowest at 0. This variable
is included to re-examine the hypothesis advanced by Easterly and Levine (1997) that Africa’s
greater ethnic and linguistic divisions help explain its slow growth. 
Finally, we also measure the difference between the growth rate of the working-age
population (between ages 15 and 65) and the growth rate of the whole population.  Countries will
have a higher per-capita growth if the working population is growing faster than the whole
y(t) ' (1&e$t)yss % e$ty(0)
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 In theoretical works $ i essentially assumed to be negative because otherwise the system4
would violate a transversality condition or output would collapse to 0. In empirical applications,
estimates of $ are virtually always negative after controlling for some determinants of steady-state
income. 
 These statements follow formally from the fact that the first derivative with respect to5
time is $ e  (y  - y(0)), and the second derivative with respect to time is $  e  (y  - y(0)).$t ss            2  $t ss
(1)
population.  This variable is used to control for such demographic influences on measured growth. 
We will see that this demographic effect accounts for an economically important part of the
overall difference in growth rates between East Asia and Africa.
II. Theoretical background.
Our analytical approach follows Barro (1991) and a number of other authors in viewing
economic growth as a transitional process in which countries are adjusting gradually from their
current level of per-capita income to their steady-state level of per-capita income.   For example,
in a Ramsey model in which the production function is Cobb-Douglas, Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(1995, p. 88) show that in the neighborhood of the steady state, the time path of the log of
per-capita income is given by 
This equation says that the log of real GDP will be equal to y(0) at time 0 and, if $<0, y in thess
limit as t approaches infinity. I  between, output will be on a path that is concave with respect to4
time, that is, growth will be fast at first and then will slow down as real GDP approaches the
steady state.  Growth will also be faster the larger is the exponent $  and the larger is the initial
income gap y- y(0).  In the cross-country empirical implementation of (1), y may be thought ofss  5         ss
not as a constant value to which the economy is converging, but as a variable with a constant
trend growth rate. 
10
 See Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992) or Sachs and Warner (1997) for derivations of6
Solow-type models.  The crucial feature of these models is that savings are assumed to be a fixed
fraction of output.
 A regression of saving rates on the log of life expectancy and government saving shows7
the following
saving / GDP = -102  + 29 log(life) + 0.72 government saving / GDP      R =0.592
                                    (10.6)                 (6.3)
Both saving variables are averages for the period 1970-90; life expectancy is measured as close as
possible to 1970.   
Equation (1) also embodies the very general idea that the transition from current GDP to
potential GDP (or the potential GDP trend line) takes time.  This is not very restrictive because
the data are allowed to estimate $, the parameter that governs the speed of adjustment, and to say
whether it is high or low. What is more important is the issue of what determines steady-state or
potential GDP.  Here we use the general framework of the Solow growth model, in which steady
state output per worker is a function of the national saving rate and the level of total factor
productivity or efficiency.  Note that in the standard Solow model, the economy converges to a6
constant output per efficiency worker, i.e. the measure of the labor input is adjusted to account
for an underlying trend of labor-augmenting technical change.  In this sense, ycan hav  ass
constant underlying trend growth rate, equal to the rate of labor-augmenting technical change. 
We think of all of our explanatory variables as potentially affecting either the level of total-factor
productivity or the national saving rate.  Openness, tropical climate, landlockedness, institutional
quality, natural resource abundance and life expectancy all potentially help to determine overall
efficiency or total factor productivity.  Government saving and life expectancy help determine
saving rates.  7
In the Solow growth model, steady-state income is a function of total factor productivity,
namely A(0) in production function notation.  In addition, initial output also enters the growth
11
  To check for outliers, we follow the criterion suggested by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch8
[1980, p. 28].  The basic idea is to exclude observations that have both extremely high residuals
and high leverage on the regression results.  The leverage of an observation is a multivariate
measure of the distance of it’s X values from the means in the sample.  Belsley, Kuh and Welsch
[1980] recommend using the DFITS statistic, due to Welsch and Kuh [1977], which combines
these two into one measure, (DFITS=r/((h/(1-h))^(½)) and suggest excluding observations with
high values. In the formulas above, r is the residual, h is the leverage, k is the number of
regressors and n is the sample size.  We applied this selection criterion to the first regression in
Table A1 in the Appendix, and discovered that there were five cases of countries with DFITS
values above 0.9 in absolute value: Botswana, Gabon, Madagascar, Guyana, and Israel.  These
five were omitted from all the regressions in table 2.  Although it is possible that this procedure
will miss groups of countries with outlying data, examination of the residuals and the leverage
statistics showed that this was not an important issue with our data.
equation, as in equation (1).  These two facts together imply that unobserved variation in A(0)
across countries will cause y(0) and growth to move together.  This will tend to bias the estimated
coefficient on initial income towards 0 (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992 p. 424).  That is, it will
be less negative than it should be. 
This bias can be diminished, but not eliminated, by controlling for as comprehensive a list
of determinants of A(0) as possible.  Our regressions explain a fairly large share of the variation in
growth across countries (just under 90 percent) but we cannot exclude the possibility that there is
some downward bias in our estimates of the speed of convergence.  
III.  Regression estimates.
The regression results are shown in Table 2.  In order to ensure that the regression
estimates do not depend on a few countries, we pre-tested for outliers and omitted five countries
from the regression sample.  In general, the two sets of regressions (with and without these five8
countries) give similar results regarding the statistical significance of the variables, but the
coefficient estimates we report in table 2 are less sensitive to the inclusion of single countries. For
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comparison, the regression results with the full sample are presented in Table A1 of the appendix. 
One slight change worth noting is that while the life expectancy terms are significant in the
regressions without the five countries (Table 2), they are only marginally significant in the full-
sample regressions (Appendix A1).  However, we prefer the coefficient estimates in Table 2 that
are less sensitive to the outliers. 
We first discuss the results regarding convergence and openness to international trade. 
We find that openness to international trade affects growth in two ways: it affects the level of
steady state income and it affects the speed of convergence to the steady state.  The reason
openness affects the level of steady-state income is a matter of ongoing research but probably
reflects some combination of the following considerations.  Openness encourages greater
efficiency in the allocation of the economy’s scarce resources; openness also promotes market
competition and thus helps reduce monopolies; and trade is often a vehicle for the importation of
technical innovations and improvements, which serve to raise total factor productivity in the entire
economy.  The reason that openness affects the speed of convergence is probably related to the
fact that our openness variable is also a proxy for opportunities for international factor mobility.
Basic theory suggests that the convergence process will be facilitated by opportunities for factor
mobility across countries, especially in the form of financial and physical capital mobility.  In the
Solow growth model for example, real incomes across countries are a function of the capital-labor
ratio, K/L, across countries.  As long as factor mobility involves the migration of capital from
regions where capital is abundant to regions where it is scarce, factor mobility will promote
convergence in the ratio K/L and therefore also in real output per capita.     
To understand the estimated quantitative impact of openness on growth and the speed of
convergence, note that our growth equation may be written in simplified form as
g="*O+$*y+&*O*y+ other terms.  Therefore, the effect of openness on growth, holding constant
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 For a closed economy, the regression coefficient is an estimate of 100(e -1)/T (with9            $2 T
T=25 in our regressions).  Solving for the (consistent) estimate of $2, we obtain -0.0206.  For an
open economy, the regression coefficient is an estimate of 100(e  -1)/T. Solving for the($2 +$3)T
estimate of $2+$3, we obtain -0.0359.  This implies that the estimate for $3 is -0.0153.  From
equation (2), the half life is given by the time T in which the term e  =0.5.  We get the($2 +$3*O)T
half-lives for closed and open economies by solving this equation for T with O=0 and O=1,
respectively.
initial income is dg/dO="+&*y.  According to the estimates of regression (1) in Table 2, when
evaluated at the mean of (log) income of 8.05, dg/dO is 2.21 (=8.48-0.77*8.05).  Therefore, for
the average country in the sample, a switch from a closed regime to a completely open regime is
estimated to raise the annual growth rate by 2.21 percentage points.  The effect of openness on
the growth rate is somewhat higher for a poorer country and somewhat lower for a country with
income per capita above the mean.
Regarding the speed of convergence, our specification implies that dg/dy=$+&*O.  For a
completely closed economy (O=0) dg/dy=-1.63.  For a completely open economy (O=1), 
dg/dy=-2.40 (=-1.63-0.77).  After some calculations, this implies that it would take a closed
economy 33 years to close half the gap between its initial income and its steady-state income.  By
contrast, it would take an open economy 19 years to close half the gap.  These estimates imply9
that the speed of convergence is considerably faster for open economies.     
We now turn to the estimated effects of life expectancy on growth.  We use life
expectancy as a variable that summarizes both the quality of public health institutions in the
country as well as a summary measure of the extent of sickness and disease.  Poor health affects
growth by reducing labor productivity, so that life expectancy may be interpreted as an additional
measure of human capital.  We also allow for the possibility that the impact of an additional year
of life expectancy on growth varies according to the level of life expectancy.  We do this by
testing for, and finding, a quadratic effect of life expectancy on growth.  According to our
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estimates, the effect on growth of an additional year of life expectancy is greater at thelower
levels of life expectancy in our sample, and is virtually zero at the higher end of our sample. 
Specifically, at the lowest level of life expectancy in our sample, that of Sierra Leone at about 32
years, raising life expectancy by one year, to 33 years, is associated with a rise in average annual
growth of 0.24 percentage points.  At higher levels of life expectancy, such as 70 in the U.S. or
France, our estimates imply that the impact of an additional year of life expectancy on GDP
growth per capita is almost exactly zero.   One possible reason for this result is that at lower
levels of life expectancy, improvements in life expectancy tend to come from basic improvements
in public health and eradication of disease, both of which should have a large effect on economy-
wide efficiency and growth.  But at high levels of life expectancy, improvements tend to be
achieved by increases in old-age survival rates, which affect people after they have left the labor
force, and therefore have less economic impact. 
 
The regression results also suggest that geographic variables play a role in explaining
growth.  The landlocked and tropical variables are significant in all regressions.  A landlocked
country’s growth is on average -0.58 percentage points lower than a country with access to the
sea.  A tropical country’s growth is on average -0.85 percentage points lower than a country
outside of the tropics.  
      
We also find that higher initial endowments of natural resources are correlated with slower
growth, as in our earlier work (Sachs and Warner, 1995b).  An increase in the initial share of
natural resource exports in GDP from 0.1 to 0.2 (10 to 20 percent) is predicted to reduce
subsequent growth by 0.33 percentage points per annum.  The reasons for this negative
association are open to question, but probably reflect a combination of dynamic Dutch disease
effects, and greater incentives for rent-seeking in resource-abundant economies.  
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The regression model also includes several policy variables (in addition to openness to
international trade, discussed above).  Higher rates of central government saving as a percent of
GDP are associated with faster growth.  The reason is presumably that as long as private saving
does not decline one-for-one with public savings, an increase in public savings will serve to raise
the overall national saving rate and thus promote capital accumulation.  This variable is measured
with some error, since it does not account for local government saving or deficits of public social
funds or public enterprises.  Nevertheless it is significant in all regressions and is the best proxy
for government saving that is available with sufficient country coverage.  Our estimates indicate
that an increase in central government saving by one percentage point of GDP is, on average,
associated with a rise in the growth rate of 0.12 percentage points.
The institutional quality index is also significantly related to growth in all the regressions. 
This index ranges from 2.3 to 10 and has a mean of 5.7.  We find that a unit change in this index
is associated with an extra 0.28 percentage points of growth per year.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, the
country with the lowest value for this index is Sudan at 2.7, and the two highest countries are
South Africa at 6.9 and Botswana at 7.  However, since this index was measured circa 1980, so
there may be some causality running from growth in the 1970's to this index value in 1980, which
would lead to a positive bias in the regression coefficient.  
The final variable in the first regression estimate is the difference between growth in the
population in the working ages (defined here as ages 15-64) and growth in the total population, a
difference which we denote as g - g.  Since GDP growth is measured in per-capita terms, thisw  p
variable is needed to control for differences in cross-country per capita growth that arise from a
changing ratio of working-aged population to total population.  For example, when  g - g isw  p
positive, the country is experiencing a rise in the proportion of the population that is of working
age.  A rising proportion of the population at working age should raise GDP per capita, so that 
16
 For two recent robustness studies that provide useful discussions of the issues, see10
Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-I-Martin (1997). 
g  - g > 0 should be associated with a higher rate of GDP growth per capita.  In fact, we expectw  p
this variable to have a coefficient of one if GDP is produced by the working aged population,
while GDP growth is measured relative to the entire population.  The estimated values in Table 2
are slightly above one, but not significantly different from one.  We find that African countries
tend to have lower values of g - g than in the rest of the world, since the demographic transitionw  p
is at a very early stage in most of Sub-Saharan Africa.  As a result, the youth-dependent
population is growing as rapidly or more rapidly than the total population, thereby reducing GDP
growth per capita.     
This completes our discussion of the variables in the baseline regression.  Of course, these
ten variables are only a subset of the large number of variables that have been proposed in the
recent literature on the determinants of cross-country growth.   Our choice of variables is based
on our reading of this literature as well as our own empirical research in recent years on this
question.  We have tried many, but not all, of the other variables proposed in the literature and
have found the alternative variables not to be significant in the presence of the ten regressors
listed in Table 2, but we cannot claim to have done an exhaustive study of the question.  It is10
worth noting that the ten variables listed in regression 1 of Table 2 account for about 90 percent
of the variation in cross-country growth between 1965 and 1990.  
Regarding the r lative quantitative impact of these ten variables in explaining cross
country growth, we have performed some simple calculations where we multiply the estimated
coefficients by the standard deviations of each variable.  The rankings, in absolute values from
highest impact to lowest impact, are openness (a one standard deviation increase in openness is
associated with an additional 0.9 percentage points in annual growth), life expectancy (0.7),
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institutional quality (0.6), central government saving (0.6), natural resource abundance (0.5),
differential growth in the economically-active population (0.4), tropical climate (0.4), and
landlocked (0.3).  This shows that the policy variables over which societies have the most control,
such as trade policy,  quality of institutions, and government saving, have had a very large
association with growth.  Geographic and resource variables tend to be of lesser significance. 
Life expectancy, which is a combination of nature (e.g. endemicity of infectious diseases in
tropical climates, soil fecundity) and public health measures, among other variables, is also very
important.        
Now we examine several variables that others have advanced to account for slow growth
in Africa.  Previous empirical growth studies have found that a dummy variables for Sub-Saharan
Africa is negative and statistically significant, indicating that previous studies failed to account for
some ‘missing element’ in explaining Africa’s slow growth. The path-breaking cross-country
growth study by Barro (1991) contained this result, and more recently Easterly and Levine (1997)
echo this finding.  They find further that the Africa dummy variable is eliminated only when they
allow for ‘neighborhood effects’, in which a countries growth depends also on growth of
neighboring countries.  This result was viewed as interesting because it suggested that individual
countries in Africa are held back not just by their own policies but by the policies of their
neighbors as well.  If true, reform would best be coordinated to be fully effective.
Our results on these issues are summarized in the second and third regressions in Table 2. 
First, after controlling for the ten basic variables, we do not find that the Sub-Saharan African
dummy variable is significant. This is shown in regression 2, where it is not even close to
statistical significance.  Second, we do not find that average growth of a country’s neighbors is
significant. This is shown in regression 3, where both the estimated coefficient and t-statistic are
virtually 0. 
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Why the differing results?  The Sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable is rendered
insignificant by the openness variable, and to a lesser extent the life expectancy variable.  That is,
if we start with regression 2 in Table 2 and simply drop the SOPEN variable, the t-ratio on the
Sub-Saharan Africa variables rises to -2.2.  If we do the same with the life expectancy variable,
the t-ratio on the Sub-Saharan Africa variables rises to -1.4.  The first result suggests that an
important missing ingredient in previous studies is the failure to account for the effect on growth
of Africa’s closed trade policies, which had the effect of cutting Africa off from the growth
dynamism of world markets.  Most of the continent has followed protectionist and inward-looking
economic policies since independence.  It is only recently that several African economies have
opened to the rest of the world.  On the insignificance of neighborhood growth, we also find that
the main reason is the presence of the openness variable.  Without openness in the regression, this
variable is significant; with openness in the regression, it is not. 
In regression 5 of Table 2, we add the national saving rate (calculated as [GDP - C -
G]/GDP, with C and G being private and public consumption spending).  This is a way to check
our assumption that our explanatory variables explain saving rates across countries.  If this is
correct, we should find that the saving rate itself is insignificant after controlling for these
variables. Regression 5 shows that the saving rate is insignificant when added to the regressions. 
This is suggestive, although certainly far from definitive, that many of the regressors are also
helping to account for saving rates across countries.  Another explanation for the small and
insignificant coefficient on national saving is large measurement error of the saving rate.  It is also
worth mentioning (regression 6 in Table 2) that average inflation does not add anything to the
explanation of growth after controlling for our ten variables.  
Another major theme in recent research is the importance of Africa’s ethnic and linguistic
divisions in retarding growth.  This is related to the long-standing view that the peculiar way that
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Africa’s national borders were drawn by the colonial powers has impeded the development of
effective nation-states and effective economic development.  Easterly and Levine (1997) have
argued this point recently using cross-country evidence.  
Easterly and Levine (1997) specific argument is that ethnic diversity leads to social and 
political divisions that divert attention from sound policy making.  Greater ethnic diversity
therefore harms growth since it leads to poorer policy choices.   We investigate this general point
in our context by examining the relation between our policy variables and the measure of ethnic
diversity in Easterly and Levine  (1997).  We first confirm that ethnic diversity does not enter the
growth regressions significantly.  This result, shown in regression 4 of Table 2, is consistent with
the argument in Easterly and Levine (1997) that if ethnic diversity matters, it does so by causing
poorer policies.  Controlling for the policies, ethno-linguistic fractionalization has no further effect
on growth.  The next question is whether ethnic diversity might help to explain the policy
variables we include in the growth regressions.    
There are three variables that we would classify as policy variables: openness, government
saving and institutional quality.  In bivariate regressions, ethnic diversity is significantly correlated
with openness and institutional quality but not with government savings. Specifically, more
ethnically diverse countries were less likely to be open during the period 1965-1990 and tended to
have poorer institutions.  At face value, these results support the Easterly and Levine (1997)
hypothesis that ethnic fractionalization leads to poorer policies, at least regarding openness and
institutions.  
We note, however, that there are some alternative explanations for Africa’s policy choices,
other than ethnic diversity.  We have argued separately (Sachs and Warner, 1995a) that the
decision to pursue state-led development (an important part of which was closure to international
trade) in newly-independent developing countries in the 1960s was in part a reaction against the
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economic policies associated with colonialism.  To be sure, many observers, not only in Africa, 
though that market-led economic development and free trade had been discredited by the example
of the Great Depression and (what appeared to be) the economic success of the Soviet bloc.  But
among African leaders seeking to lead their countries sharply away from their colonial past, free
trade and market-led development had an additional stigma as being the policies of the colonial
rulers.  When we examine the cross-country evidence, we find that countries with a colonial past
were more likely to follow closed economic policies, and that this effect diminishes the association
between ethnic diversity and closed economic policies.  Specifically, a regression of our openness
variable on dummy variable that takes the value 1 for ex-colonies and the ethnic diversity variable
yields the following.
open6590 = 0.62 - 0.002 ethling  - 0.32 colony                             R= 0.202
                            (-1.33)             ( -3.38)
This result (t-ratio in parentheses) provides evidence that ex-colonies were more closed to
international trade than other countries.  More ethnically diverse countries were also more closed,
but this relationship is no longer statistically significant after controling for the colony variable.  
We would also suggest that the ethno-linguistic fractionalization might itself be caused by
poor economic and geographical conditions.  Linguistic diversity tends to be high, for example, in
mountanous, remote, landlocked, and tropical environments.  It may well be that such difficult
physical environments lead to linguistic “niches,” and make difficult the diffusion of a single
linguistic standard.  We are now exploring this possibility in further research.
4. The problem of missing countries.
An important issue when examining Africa in cross-country regressions is that African
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countries do not have as comprehensive economic data as most other regions.  As a consequence,
many African countries tend to get left out of the regressions.  Therefore we have done some
additional analysis to see whether this biases our results.  Do we appear to ‘explain’ Africa by a
sample-selection process in which the readily-explained countries tend to have good data, and
therefore remain in our sample, while the difficult cases happen to have missing data, and
therefore get omitted from our sample?   In Table 3 we show the 23 African countries in our
regression sample, along with their actual per-capita growth rates and their predicted growth from
the regressions.  This sample includes the three African countries with large residuals, Botswana,
Gabon and Madagascar. Overall, however, predicted growth (0.44 percent per year) is close to
actual growth (0.41) for this subset of countries.  The errors for most of the countries are not
large.
What about African countries not in the regression sample?  In table 4 we list 23 African
countries that lacked some of the regression data.  Several of these countries were omitted from
the regression sample for having missing values for only one or two of the eleven explanatory
variables.  (The exact reason for omission can be seen in the data appendix where we report the
data country by country.)   For those countries that lack three or fewer variables, we have
replaced the missing values with the average value for all other African countries.  This allows us
to compute a quasi-predicted value for growth, which can then be compared with actual growth.
The results are that we predict higher growth on average than actually occurred for these
countries. The first column of Table 4 reports the actual growth rates; the second column reports
the quasi-predicted growth rates, and the third column reports how many imputations were
necessary in order to perform the calculations.  Average growth across all 23 countries was 0.67
percent per year and ‘predicted’ growth was 1.02 percent per year.  This is a larger gap than
among the 23 African countries in the regression, where average actual and average predicted
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were virtually identical, but it is not an enormous average error. 
Overall, there are four countries in Africa where our predictions are quite different from
measured growth: Chad, Gabon, Madagascar and Mozambique.  Two of these, Chad and
Mozambique were involved in a civil war during much of the sample, so it is not surprising that
they have lower growth than we predict.  Gabon and Madagascar have no simple explanation. 
According to the available data, Gabon’s growth was tremendously fast up to about 1980, and
then per-capita GDP declined rapidly over the next 15 years.  This appears to be a case of two
sharply different episodes, which we do not explain well by the formal econometrics.  Madagascar
has had a declining per-capita GDP for many years; we also do not explain this case very well in
the context of the growth equation.
  
Apart from these countries, there is little evidence that our growth analysis does
significantly worse for Africa than for other regions of the world.  The standard error of the
regression with all regions the world included is 0.67.  The standard error for the 23 African
countries in the regression (Table 3) is 0.89.  The standard error for the 23 African countries in
table 4 is 1.00. This is slightly higher than 0.67, but not tremendously higher when one considers
the inevitable errors that arise from our data imputations. 
V. Policy Implications
The African economies have paid an enormous economic price as a result of highly
distorted trade policies since independence.  A small number of African economies adopted open
trade: Botswana and Mauritius by the early 1970s, Morocco and Tunisia in the mid-1980s.  These
economies have out-performed the rest of Africa by a wide margin. (Morocco and Tunisia have
presumably benefited as well by their close proximity to Europe, which has facilitated their
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successes in export processing industries, especially textiles and apparel.)  Many other African
economies have begun to liberalize trade by the end of the 1980s. The CFA Franc devaluation in
January 1994, nearly a decade overdue, should help West Africa to reorient towards export-led
growth.  The African economies also suffer from relatively poorly functioning markets, as the
result of weak market supporting institutions. 
In Table 5, we examine the possible growth implications of changes in key policies, using
the earlier regression results.  To understand this table, we start with an estimated 2.5 percent
growth rate for a baseline developing economy.  As we read down the second column, we include
the deviations from this growth rate that a country could expect if it had average African
geographical and structural characteristics, but policies (openness, institutional quality, and
government saving) at average levels of all developing countries.  First, since Africa had lower
initial income than the typical LDC, such a country would have benefited from catch-up growth,
which we estimate would have added 1.0 percentage point to annual growth.  Further down we
see that greater landlockedness of Africa compared to other LDC’s would have taken 0.1 percent
from growth, etc.  Taking all the African characteristics together, our final estimate is that a
country with African structure and LDC policies could have grown at 1.4 percent per year.  
In the first column, we include the changes that would have come about if the
representative country has average African polic es i addition to average African geography and
structure.  Our estimates are that Africa’s greater closure to international trade than the average
LDC cost it about 0.7 percentage points in growth compared to the baseline.  Africa’s slightly
higher government savings added about 0.2 percentage points, and Africa’s lower level of
institutional quality was too small a difference (with the average LDC country) to have a
significant quantitative impact.  The sum of these changes, reported in the last row is growth of
0.8 percent per year, about the same as the average African country actually achieved during
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1965-90 (Table 1).
How fast would Africa have grown had it followed the policies of the fast-growing East
Asian countries, but still had the adverse geographic and structural conditions of Africa?  In the
final column of Table 5, we estimate that if Africa had East-Asia’s level of openness, the rate of
convergence would have been faster, that is, the catch-up effect would have added 1.2 percentage
points to growth rather than 0.9.  Greater openness would also have raised potential income and
added an extra 1.4 percentage points to growth.  Higher levels of government saving and
institutional quality would have added an additional 0.5 percentage points to growth.  The final
row of the table shows that even with African levels of life expectancy, climate, geography and
demographic trends, all of which are estimated to hinder growth, we estimate that Africa could
have achieved per capita growth of 4.3 percent per annum if it had followed fast-growth policies. 
This is not as fast as the 6 percent rates achieved in East Asia, but with 4.3 percent growth real
incomes double every 16 years. 
6. Evidence on growth and reform in Africa.
This section looks at the impact on GDP growth of the reforms that have been
implemented so far in Africa.  Our evidence in this paper, as well as in related work (Sachs and
Warner, 1995a), suggests that openness to the international marketplace of goods, foreign
investment and technology is a crucial element of any pro-growth reform package.  Trade
openness not only promotes more efficient allocation of resources, opens the door to
technological diffusion from abroad, and undermines local monopolies, but it also tends to
constrain countries from adopting other anti-growth policies that would lead to exchange rate
crises or problems with its foreign payments.  With this in mind, we use trade liberalization to rate
which countries in Africa have reformed and to assess the effect on growth of economic reform.  
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 Following McPherson and Radelet (1995), Figure 1 uses IMF data for The Gambia. 11
The rest of the data are from the World Banks CD ROM: World Data 1995.
We divided African economies into three groups.  The first group are countries which
have reformed trade policy to qualify as “open” by the standards in Sachs and Warner (1995a). 
The second group are countries which have either engaged in an partial reforms or are sometimes
classified as reformers by independent observers (e.g. the international institutions).  The final
group are countries which have not reformed by the standards of most or all observers.  For the
reformers we also present our best estimate of the date for the onset of reforms.  
Our assessment of the impact of pro-growth reform in Africa is given in the set of graphs
in Figure 1.  The graphs present the log of real per-capita GDP for the seven reformist countries. 
We simply draw a line to represent our estimated date of reform.  In most cases openness to
international markets in Africa has resulted in fast growth.  This has been true of Mauritius and
Botswana for decades.  It is also the case in Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Uganda more
recently.  The Gambia experienced rapid per-capita immediately after the reforms in 1986 and
then a leveling off.  On the whole, the record -- though limited in number of countries and time11
periods -- is a promising one, especially in light of the poor performance of non-reformers in
Africa (see figures at the end of the Appendix). The evidence simply does not support the
pessimism that market-oriented pro-growth reforms would not work in Africa.  Where such
reforms have been tried in a serious, sustained manner, economic reforms appear to have raised
growth in Africa as they have in other parts of the world.    
7. Concluding remarks. 
Our evidence suggests that Africa is not structurally incapable of rapid rates of economic
growth seen in other parts of the developing world in recent years. Our regression evidence
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suggests that part of the explanation for Africa’s slow growth lies with natural factors such as
limited access to the sea, natural resource abundance, and tropical climate.  However, the
evidence also suggests that basic economic policies such as openness to international trade,
government saving and market-supporting institutions have had an even larger quantitative impact
on economic growth rates.  We also find that differences in life expectancy and demographic
factors help account for Africa’s slow growth compared to other developing countries.
After controlling for all these variables, we find little evidence for other variables that have
been suggested in the literature on African and developing-country growth.  First, we do not find
that neighborhood effects (i.e. growth rates of contiguous countries) are especially important in
explaining an individual country’s growth.  We also do not find evidence that sub-Saharan Africa
as a region has any additional unmeasured growth deterrent, or that the regression residuals are
significantly higher for Africa than other countries.  An important reason for this result, which
differs form previous studies, is our emphasis on the role of openness (both geographical and via
trade policy) on the growth process, as well as other geographical and demographic variables.  
Africa’s closure to the outside world had several dimensions.  The export marketing
boards typically evolved into institutions which bought agricultural products at very low prices
and then re-sold them at much higher world prices, an arrangement that was essentially equivalent
to high export taxes.  Prospective manufacturing exporters in Africa typically faced prohibitive
trade barriers and geographical barriers in importing intermediate inputs or capital equipment. 
The Franco-phone countries of the CFA zone experienced currency overvaluation that reduced
the profitability of exporting.  
Recently, Africa has lagged behind other regions in trade liberalization.  In a
comprehensive review of the recent trade policy revolution in developing countries, Judith Dean
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 Dean (1995), p. 187, based on research reported in Dean, Desai and Riedel (1994).12
concludes that “Only in Africa do we find little progress towards a liberalized trade regime.  Here
there have been important cases of reversal of policy, no liberalization, or increased import
impediments during this period.”   Most countries in Africa still have a variety of quantitative12
restrictions and exchange controls that make importing very costly and difficult (Dean, Desai and
Riedel, 1994).   
Our estimates suggest that even with its natural disadvantages, Africa could have grown at
over 4 percent per year in per capita terms with appropriate policies.  In addition, the available
evidence so far is that African countries that have engaged in serious pro-growth economic
reforms have achieved impressive growth rates.  Overall, we find little compelling empirical
evidence in favor of growth pessimism for Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, even after the policy changes, the African economies will continue to suffer
from at least three structural conditions: landlockedness for no fewer than 14 economies
(representing around one third of the African population); a high natural-resource dependence,
with the consequent Dutch-disease costs to long-term growth; and (apparently) higher incidence
of disease and lower life expectancy, probably linked to the very difficult geographical conditions
in tropical Africa.  All three of these conditions can and should be addressed.  It is a very high
priority for landlocked countries to gain efficient, low-cost transport to coastal port facilities.  The
international community can help to assure this, partly through infrastructure financing and partly
through mediation of political conflicts that hamper the market access of landlocked countries. 
As for natural resource abundance, we need to learn more about the growth experiences of the
few successful resource-rich developing countries (especially Chile and Malaysia), to identify the
best strategies for managing resource wealth while spurring the growth of non-traditional exports. 
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Finally, the health deficit in tropical Africa needs to be addressed through a combination of
enhanced social policies (e.g. improved primary health and education for rural Africans), as well
as increased scientific efforts to control or eradicate major tropical diseases such as malaria.    
Table 1.  Africa compared with other developing countries 
Fast-growth All other Developing
Africa Economies Economies
Real Growth per
Capita 1965-1990 0.80 5.83 1.76
Real GDP per
Economically-Active
Population 1965 (PPP 85 $) 1480 2703 2585
Openness to international
trade (share of country-years
open 1965 - 1990, range 0-1) 0.07 0.81 0.19
Fraction of land-locked
countries 0.33 0.00 0.11
Life expectancy (circa 1970) 41.6 57.1 51.9
Average National 
Saving Ratio 1970-1990 7.18 22.64 10.13
Central government
saving (current expenditures
-current revenues, 1970-1990) 4.14 4.97 1.18
Fraction of country-months in
tropical climates 0.89 0.69 0.59
Institutional Quality Index
(ICRG average c. 1980, higher
better) 4.54 6.86 4.29
Natural Resource Abundance
(n.r. exports divided by GDP
in 1970) 0.18 0.09 0.12
Average annual 
Inflation 149.07 54.69 91.79
Growth of Neighboring 
Economies, 70-89 0.50 3.81 1.80
Index of Ethno-
linguistic Fractionalization 64.54 42.86 32.44
Growth of economically
active population - total
population growth -0.09 0.82 0.33
Table 2.  Regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Growth per-capita of ppp-adjusted GDP, 1965-1990
Log of Real GDP per
Economically-Active -1.63 -1.63 -1.63 -1.74 -1.63 -1.64
Population in 1965 -8.47 -7.89 -8.03 -8.64 -8.34 -7.43
Openness times log -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.66 -0.81 -0.81
GDP per ea in 65 -2.54 -2.52 -2.36 -2.17 -2.63 -2.42
Openness to international
trade (share of years 8.48 8.48 8.50 7.57 8.82 8.77
open 65-90) 3.44 3.41 3.22 3.02 3.50 2.75
Land-locked -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.47
Dummy variable -2.69 -2.63 -2.57 -2.64 -2.64 -1.94
Log life expectancy 45.48 45.53 45.46 48.38 46.94 43.87
Circa 1970 2.60 2.58 2.55 2.73 2.65 2.41
Square of log life -5.40 -5.40 -5.39 -5.79 -5.58 -5.15
Expectancy -2.41 -2.39 -2.36 -2.54 -2.45 -2.20
Central Government 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Saving, 70-90 5.40 5.34 5.28 5.29 5.10 4.85
Dummy for -0.85 -0.85 -0.85 -0.91 -0.80 -0.81
Tropical climate -3.64 -3.54 -3.58 -3.72 -3.34 -3.37
Institutional 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.26
Quality Index 3.95 3.49 3.60 4.05 3.92 3.49
Natural Resource -3.26 -3.28 -3.27 -3.12 -3.31 -3.38
Exports / GDP 1970 -3.41 -3.30 -3.28 -3.21 -3.35 -3.44
growth in e.a. pop 1.19 1.20 1.19 1.28 1.11 1.11
minus pop growth 3.82 3.41 3.74 3.87 3.40 3.42










Adjusted R 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.882
Number of countries 79 79 78 77 77 74
Table 3.  Actual and predicted growth: 23 African countries in the regression sample
Country Actual Predicted Growth
Growth from Regression
BOTSWANA 5.71 6.53














SIERRA LEONE -0.83 -1.32
SOMALIA -0.98 -0.41







Root Mean Squared Error 0.89
Table 4.  Actual and “predicted” growth for African countries not in the regression sample
Country Actual “Predicted” Growth Number of 
Growth based on regression times that missing
evidence and best data was replaced
available data by Africa averages
ANGOLA . . .
BENIN -0.96 0.96 1
BURUNDI 1.39 2.15 1
CAPE VERDE IS. 3.63 . .
CENTRAL AFR.R. -0.50 0.05 1
CHAD -2.37 -0.60 2
COMOROS -0.53 . .
DJIBOUTI . . .
ETHIOPIA . . .
GUINEA 1.36 1.75 1
GUINEA-BISS 0.49 1.26 2
LESOTHO 3.45 3.16 3
LIBERIA . . .
MAURITANIA -0.43 -0.49 1
MAURITIUS 2.50 1.92 1
MOZAMBIQUE -2.03 -0.59 2
NAMIBIA 0.88 . .
REUNION . . .
RWANDA 3.05 2.07 1
SEYCHELLES 4.39 . .
SUDAN . . .
SWAZILAND 1.71 0.61 3
TOGO 1.07 1.04 1
Average for 13 countries with 
3 or fewer imputations 0.67 1.02
Root Mean Squared Error 1.00
Table 5.  African Growth: with average African policies, average less-developed-country policies and average fast-
growing-economy policies.
African Policies LDC Policies Fast-growth Policies
Baseline Growth 2.5 2.5 2.5
Catch-up 0.9 1.0 1.2
Openness -0.7 0.0 1.4
Interaction (Openness*GDP) -0.1 0.0 0.2
Government  surplus 0.2 0.0 0.3
Institutional Quality -0.0 0.0 0.6
Landlocked -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Life Expectancy -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Tropics -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Natural Resource Endowments -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Growth of ec. Active pop -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Predicted Growth 0.8 1.4 4.3
Table 6.  Market-oriented pro-growth economic reform in Africa, the record
Consensus reformers year of reform 
Botswana 1979
The Gambia 1986



































Appendix Table A1.  Regression estimates 
Dependent variable: Growth per-capita of ppp-adjusted GDP, 1965-1990
Log of Real GDP per
Economically-Active -1.47 -1.51 -1.42 -1.51 -1.51 -1.44
Population in 1965 -6.41 -6.16 -6.05 -6.23 -6.68 -5.45
Openness times log -1.14 -1.14 -1.18 -1.09 -1.16 -1.21
GDP per ea in 65 -3.29 -3.26 -3.23 -3.06 -3.38 -3.01
Openness to international
trade (share of years 11.43 11.34 11.52 11.00 11.49 11.93
open 65-90) 4.02 3.96 3.88 3.73 4.06 3.67
Land-locked -0.59 -0.56 -0.48 -0.60 -0.60 -0.49
Dummy variable -2.36 -2.18 -1.86 -2.32 -2.45 -1.74
Log life expectancy 37.79 37.27 43.03 38.17 37.96 36.79
Circa 1970 1.91 1.87 2.15 1.89 1.94 1.74
Square of log life -4.39 -4.34 -5.07 -4.44 -4.44 -4.24
Expectancy -1.74 -1.71 -1.98 -1.72 -1.78 -1.57
Central Government 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11
Saving, 70-90 5.22 5.20 4.98 5.03 4.34 4.56
Dummy for -0.84 -0.81 -0.83 -0.91 -0.81 -0.82
Tropical climate -3.01 -2.83 -2.99 -3.08 -2.91 -2.75
Institutional 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.29
Quality Index 3.79 3.57 3.86 3.66 3.56 3.27
Natural Resource -3.95 -3.81 -3.74 -4.00 -3.78 -4.10
Exports / GDP 1970 -4.01 -3.70 -3.76 -3.87 -3.87 -3.99
growth in e.a. pop 0.86 0.75 0.80 0.94 0.76 0.77
minus pop growth 2.48 1.89 2.30 2.58 2.18 2.11










Adjusted R 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.862
Number of countries 84 84 83 82 82 79
Appendix Table A2.  Data for 23 African countries in the regression sample
country g6590 lgdpea65 gea-gpop open6590 access tropics icrge80 lifee(years)
cgb7090 sxp g7089n ethling
BOTSWANA 5.71 7.10 0.43 0.42 1.00 0.50 7.00 46.60
20.86 0.05 -0.05 51.00
BURKINA FASO 1.26 6.52 -0.14 0.00 1.00 1.00 4.75 37.20
1.82 0.04 -0.80 68.00
CAMEROON 2.40 7.10 -0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.66 44.20
5.56 0.18 1.05 89.00
CONGO 2.85 7.60 -0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.69 48.20
9.45 0.08 -0.42 66.00
GABON 1.73 8.35 -0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.38 41.40
16.21 0.33 2.53 69.00
GAMBIA 0.35 7.17 -0.11 0.19 0.00 1.00 5.63 33.00
5.35 0.36 -0.03 73.00
GHANA 0.07 7.45 0.01 0.23 0.00 1.00 3.70 46.20
-0.74 0.21 -0.19 71.00
IVORY COAST -0.56 7.89 -0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00 6.70 40.20
5.27 0.29 0.15 86.00
KENYA 1.61 7.14 -0.05 0.12 0.00 1.00 5.56 45.80
1.01 0.18 1.81 83.00
MADAGASCAR -1.99 7.63 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.90 4.67 41.80
3.18 0.12 -3.36 6.00
MALAWI 0.92 6.68 -0.12 0.00 1.00 1.00 4.47 38.40
1.94 0.21 -0.77 62.00
MALI 0.82 6.71 -0.17 0.12 1.00 1.00 3.00 36.80
6.37 0.08 1.45 78.00
NIGER -0.69 7.12 -0.15 0.00 1.00 1.00 5.83 36.00
4.03 0.05 1.64 73.00
NIGERIA 1.89 7.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.08 40.60
6.04 0.14 -0.21 87.00
SENEGAL -0.01 7.69 -0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.75 40.20
1.20 0.14 1.49 75.00
SIERRA LEONE -0.83 7.60 -0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.42 32.00
-1.58 0.09 1.29 77.00
SOMALIA -0.98 7.51 -0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.73 37.00
1.33 0.09 5.55 8.00
SOUTH AFRICA 0.85 8.48 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.92 50.00
1.03 0.17 -1.17 88.00
TANZANIA 1.93 6.58 -0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.64 41.60
1.30 0.17 -0.55 93.00
UGANDA -0.41 7.10 -0.14 0.12 1.00 1.00 2.97 44.00
-1.45 0.27 0.30 .
ZAIRE -1.15 6.93 -0.26 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.98 42.40
-0.00 0.15 0.22 90.00
ZAMBIA -1.88 7.66 -0.18 0.00 1.00 1.00 4.14 42.80
-3.31 0.54 -1.20 82.00
ZIMBABWE 0.86 7.58 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 4.44 46.20
-3.34 0.17 -2.45 54.00
AVERAGE 0.64 7.33 -0.09 0.05 0.39 0.93 4.74 41.14
3.55 0.18 0.27 69.50
Appendix Table A3.  Data for African Countries not in the regression sample
country g6590 lgdpea65 gea-gpop open6590 access tropics icrge80 lifee(years)
cgb7090 sxp g7089n ethling
ANGOLA . 7.57 -0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.27 .
. . -1.44 78.00
BENIN -0.96 7.72 -0.15 0.04 0.00 1.00 . 40.00
9.60 0.08 0.93 62.00
BURUNDI 1.39 6.62 -0.04 0.0 1.00 1.00 . 42.60
6.94 0.10 -1.14 4.00
CAPE VERDE IS. 3.63 6.76 0.15 . 0.00 1.00 . 53.00
. 0.04 . .
CENTRAL AFR.R. -0.50 7.06 -0.21 0.00 1.00 1.00 . 39.80
0.03 0.09 -0.30 83.00
CHAD -2.37 7.17 -0.18 0.00 1.00 1.00 . 35.40
. 0.08 0.92 69.00
COMOROS -0.53 . . . 0.00 1.00 . 44.80
. . . .
DJIBOUTI . . . . 0.00 . . .
. . 6.45 .
ETHIOPIA . 6.32 -0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.42 42.40
. . 1.62 69.00
GUINEA 1.36 6.95 -0.13 0.19 0.00 1.00 4.42 .
. . -0.38 75.00
GUINEA-BISS 0.49 6.93 -0.33 0.15 0.00 1.00 3.23 35.00
12.57 . 1.11 .
LESOTHO 3.45 6.60 -0.17 . 1.00 0.00 . 48.00
6.10 . 0.14 22.00
LIBERIA . 7.32 -0.26 . 0.00 1.00 2.93 42.20
2.92 0.49 -0.29 83.00
MAURITANIA -0.43 7.39 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.80 . 36.00
6.91 0.41 2.34 33.00
MAURITIUS 2.50 8.72 0.97 1.00 0.00 1.00 . 60.20
0.49 0.29 2.22 58.00
MOZAMBIQUE -2.03 7.74 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.60 5.22 36.20
. . 0.89 65.00
NAMIBIA 0.88 8.34 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.50 . .
. . -0.14 .
REUNION . . . . 0.00 . . .
. . . .
RWANDA 3.05 6.52 -0.14 0.00 1.00 1.00 . 47.80
2.25 0.11 -1.10 14.00
SEYCHELLES 4.39 . . . 0.00 1.00 . .
. . . .
SUDAN . . -0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.73 39.40
1.19 0.16 2.27 73.00
SWAZILAND 1.71 8.07 -0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 . 41.60
10.10 . -0.28 .
TOGO 1.07 6.82 -0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.35 40.60
. 0.19 0.76 71.00
AVERAGE 0.89 7.35 -0.09 0.08 0.26 0.85 4.08 42.89
5.50 0.20 0.71 54.28
Figure 1 : Log of real per-capita GDP, Seven Reformist African Economies. (Data for 1993 and 1994 are
projections)
Appendix figures : Log of real per-capita GDP, Non-reforming African Economies. (Data for 1993 and 1994
are projections)
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Data Appendix: List of Variables
G6590 Average annual growth in real GDP per person between 1965 and 1990.   GDP data are
from the Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6, and are adjusted for differences in the purchasing
power across countries (see Summers and Heston 1981).  The population data is from the
World Data CD-ROM, 1995, World Bank. 
LGDPEA65 The log of real GDP per head of the economically active population in 1965.  As above,
GDP data are from the Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6, and are adjusted for differences in the
purchasing power across countries (see Summers and Heston 1981).  The economically
active population is defined as the population between the ages 15-64.  The population data
is from the World Data CD-ROM, 1995, World Bank. 
OPEN6590 The fraction of years during the period 1965-1990 in which the country is rated as an open
economy according to the criteria in Sachs and Warner [1995].
ACCESS Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a country is completely landlocked; 0 otherwise. 
Source: Authors.
LIFEE Life Expectancy in years, circa 1970.  Source: Jong-wha Lee.
CGB7090 Average value of central government savings over the period 1970-1990. Savings is defined
as current revenues minus current expenditure, and is measured in percent of GDP.  Source:
World Data CD-ROM, 1995, World Bank. 
TROPICS Approximate fraction of a country’s land area that is subject to a tropical climate.  Source:
Authors. 
ICRGE80 Institutional quality index.  This is  an unweighted average of 5 sub-indexes developed from
data by Political Risk Services, measuring the following.  The rule of law index  “reflects the
degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to
make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes” The bureaucratic quality index
measures “autonomy from political pressure”, and “strength and expertise to govern without
drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.”  The corruption in
government index measures whether “illegal payments are generally expected throughout ..
government”, in the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange
controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans.”  The risk of expropriation index
measures high risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization.” The government
repudiation of contracts indexmeasures the “risk of a modification in a contract taking the
form of a repudiation, postponement or scaling down.”  These five sub-indexes are scaled
and averaged together into our overall institutional quality index. This index was originally
constructed by the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) from data
printed in the International Country Risk Guide published by Political Risk Services.  See
Knack and Keefer (1994) for further details.
SXP Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970.  Primary products or natural resource
exports are exports of “fuels” and “non-fuel primary products” from the World Data 1995
CD-ROM disk, produced by the World Bank.  Non-fuel primary products correspond to
SITC categories 0, 1, 2, 4, and 68. Fuels correspond to SITC category 3.  These categories
are from revision 1 of the SITC. GNP is taken from the same source.  Both numerator and
denominator are measured in nominal dollars. The Wo ld Data uses a smoothed exchange
rate to convert local currency GNP to dollars.  This describes the basic data.  In addition, we
made the following modifications.  Bangladesh: 1975 data. Bahrain: 1980 data. Botswana:
Exports of Diamonds in 1970 taken from Modise (1996). Cape Verde: export data for 1972
taken from World Tables 1994, World Bank; GNP data taken from the World Da a 1995
CD-ROM disk. China: 1980 data.  Cyprus: 1975 data.  Jordan 1985 data. Iran: GNP in 1970
calculated with data in the Penn World Tables, mark 5.6 together with price and exchange
rate data in the World Data 1995 CD-ROM disk. Myanmar: 1970 GNP converted to dollars
by the authors using the 1970 nominal exchange rate. Taiwan: Exports taken from Taiwan
Statistical Data Book 1995, page 194 and GNP taken from 1996 volume, page 1.  Uganda:
1980 data.  South Africa: the published trade statistics do not include raw diamonds and
gold, so these were added by the authors using data in Bulletin of Statistics, The Republic of
South Africa, Pretoria, December 1972 and June 1992. Singapore: used net exports of
natural resources because Singapore simply re-exports a lot of natural resources which
originate elsewhere.  Trinidad: used net exports for the same reason as Singapore. United
Arab Emirates: 1973 data. Zimbabwe: 1980 data. 
INFL6590 Average annual inflation.  Measured as the difference in the log of the GDP deflator between
1990 and 1965 divided by 25 and multiplied by 100.  Source: World Data CD-ROM, 1995,
World Bank.  
INV7089 Ratio of real gross domestic investment (public plus private) to real GDP, averaged over the
period 1970-1989.  Source: Barro and Lee, 1994, who in turn used Summers and Heston v.
5.5.
SSAFRICA Dummy variable equal to 1 for sub-Saharan African countries, 0 otherwise.
G7089N Average annual growth of neighboring economies.  For each country, we summed GDP and
population of all neighboring economies.  Then standard growth rates for GDP per-capita
were calculated for this aggregation.  
NS7089 National saving as a percent of GDP.  Source: World Bank, World Data 1995, CD-ROM.
GEA-GPOP Average annual growth of the economically active population minus average annual growth
of the total population 1965-1990.  Source: World Bank, World Data 1995, CD-ROM.
ETHLING Measure of Ethno-linguistic fractionalization used previously in Easterly and Levine (1997)
This variable measures the probability that two randomly-selected people from a country
will not belong to the same ethnic or linguistic group.
Data Appendix: Data
COUNTRY SHCODE56 G6590 LGDPEA65     LGDPEA65*
     OPEN6590
AFRICA
BOTSWANA 4 5.71 7.10 3.00 
BURKINA FASO 5 1.26 6.52 0.00 
CAMEROON 7 2.40 7.10 0.00 
CONGO 12 2.85 7.60 0.00 
EGYPT 14 2.51 7.58 0.00 
GABON 16 1.73 8.35 0.00 
GAMBIA 17 0.35 7.17 1.38 
GHANA 18 0.07 7.45 1.72 
IVORY COAST 21 -0.56 7.89 0.00 
KENYA 22 1.61 7.14 0.82 
MADAGASCAR 25 -1.99 7.63 0.00 
MALAWI 26 0.92 6.68 0.00 
MALI 27 0.82 6.71 0.77 
MOROCCO 30 2.22 7.80 1.80 
NIGER 33 -0.69 7.12 0.00 
NIGERIA 34 1.89 7.09 0.00 
SENEGAL 37 -0.01 7.69 0.00 
SIERRA LEONE 39 -0.83 7.60 0.00 
SOMALIA 40 -0.98 7.51 0.00 
SOUTH AFRICA 41 0.85 8.48 0.00 
TANZANIA 44 1.93 6.58 0.00 
TUNISIA 46 3.44 7.81 0.60 
UGANDA 47 -0.41 7.10 0.82 
ZAIRE 48 -1.15 6.93 0.00 
ZAMBIA 49 -1.88 7.66 0.00 
ZIMBABWE 50 0.86 7.58 0.00 
NORTH AMERICA 
CANADA 54 2.74 9.60 9.60 
COSTA RICA 55 1.41 8.52 1.31 
DOMINICAN REP. 57 2.12 7.85 0.00 
EL SALVADOR 58 0.19 8.15 0.31 
GUATEMALA 60 0.71 8.16 0.94 
HAITI 61 -0.25 7.40 0.00 
HONDURAS 62 0.84 7.71 0.00 
JAMAICA 63 0.78 8.32 3.20 
MEXICO 64 2.22 8.82 1.70 
NICARAGUA 65 -2.24 8.45 0.00 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 71 0.76 9.39 0.00 
U.S.A. 72 1.76 9.87 9.87 
SOUTH AMERICA
ARGENTINA 73 -0.25 8.97 0.00 
BOLIVIA 74 0.85 7.82 6.02 
BRAZIL 75 3.10 8.16 0.00 
CHILE 76 1.13 8.69 5.01 
COLOMBIA 77 2.39 8.19 1.58 
ECUADOR 78 2.21 8.05 5.57 
GUYANA 79 -1.47 8.06 0.97 
PARAGUAY 80 2.06 7.88 0.61 
PERU 81 -0.56 8.48 0.98 
URUGUAY 83 0.88 8.67 0.33 
VENEZUELA 84 -0.84 9.60 0.74 
ASIA
CHINA 88 3.35 6.94 0.00 
HONG KONG 89 5.78 8.73 8.73 
INDIA 90 2.03 7.21 0.00 
INDONESIA 91 4.74 6.99 5.65 
ISRAEL 94 2.81 8.95 2.07 
JAPAN 95 4.66 8.79 8.79 
JORDAN 96 2.43 8.04 8.04 
KOREA, SOUTH 97 7.41 7.58 6.70 
MALAYSIA 100 4.49 8.10 8.10 
PAKISTAN 105 1.76 7.49 0.00 
PHILIPPINES 106 1.39 7.78 0.90 
SINGAPORE 109 7.39 8.15 8.15 
SRI LANKA 110 2.30 7.67 1.77 
SYRIA 111 2.65 8.37 0.32 
TAIWAN 112 6.35 8.05 8.05 
THAILAND 113 4.59 7.71 7.71 
EUROPE
AUSTRIA 116 2.91 9.18 9.18 
BELGIUM 117 2.70 9.27 9.27 
DENMARK 121 2.01 9.47 9.47 
FINLAND 122 3.08 9.21 9.21 
FRANCE 123 2.58 9.37 9.37 
GERMANY, WEST 125 2.37 9.41 9.41 
GREECE 126 3.17 8.45 8.45 
IRELAND 129 3.37 8.84 8.50 
ITALY 130 3.15 9.07 9.07 
NETHERLANDS 133 2.27 9.38 9.38 
NORWAY 134 3.05 9.30 9.30 
PORTUGAL 136 4.54 8.25 8.25 
SPAIN 138 2.95 8.87 8.87 
SWEDEN 139 1.80 9.56 9.56 
SWITZERLAND 140 1.57 9.74 9.74 
TURKEY 141 2.92 8.12 0.62 
U.K. 142 2.18 9.38 9.38 
SOUTH PACIFIC
AUSTRALIA 145 1.97 9.57 9.57 
NEW ZEALAND 147 0.97 9.63 1.85 
COUNTRY OPEN6590 ACCESS ln(LIFEE) ln(LIFEE)^2
AFRICA
BOTSWANA 0.42 1 3.84 14.76 
BURKINA FASO 0.00 1 3.62 13.08 
CAMEROON 0.00 0 3.79 14.35 
CONGO 0.00 0 3.88 15.02 
EGYPT 0.00 0 3.85 14.86 
GABON 0.00 0 3.72 13.86 
GAMBIA 0.19 0 3.50 12.23 
GHANA 0.23 0 3.83 14.69 
IVORY COAST 0.00 0 3.69 13.64 
KENYA 0.12 0 3.82 14.63 
MADAGASCAR 0.00 0 3.73 13.93 
MALAWI 0.00 1 3.65 13.31 
MALI 0.12 1 3.61 13.00 
MOROCCO 0.23 0 3.87 14.95 
NIGER 0.00 1 3.58 12.84 
NIGERIA 0.00 0 3.70 13.72 
SENEGAL 0.00 0 3.69 13.64 
SIERRA LEONE 0.00 0 3.47 12.01 
SOMALIA 0.00 0 3.61 13.04 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.00 0 3.91 15.30 
TANZANIA 0.00 0 3.73 13.90 
TUNISIA 0.08 0 3.91 15.27 
UGANDA 0.12 1 3.78 14.32 
ZAIRE 0.00 1 3.75 14.04 
ZAMBIA 0.00 1 3.76 14.11 
ZIMBABWE 0.00 1 3.83 14.69 
NORTH AMERICA 
CANADA 1.00 0 4.27 18.22 
COSTA RICA 0.15 0 4.14 17.17 
DOMINICAN REP. 0.00 0 3.98 15.85 
EL SALVADOR 0.04 0 3.96 15.67 
GUATEMALA 0.12 0 3.85 14.82 
HAITI 0.00 0 3.78 14.25 
HONDURAS 0.00 0 3.87 14.99 
JAMAICA 0.38 0 4.16 17.27 
MEXICO 0.19 0 4.07 16.54 
NICARAGUA 0.00 0 3.88 15.08 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 0.00 0 4.17 17.37 
U.S.A. 1.00 0 4.25 18.05 
SOUTH AMERICA
ARGENTINA 0.00 0 4.18 17.48 
BOLIVIA 0.77 1 3.77 14.22 
BRAZIL 0.00 0 4.02 16.17 
CHILE 0.58 0 4.06 16.52 
COLOMBIA 0.19 0 4.00 15.97 
ECUADOR 0.69 0 4.00 16.00 
GUYANA 0.12 0 4.11 16.90 
PARAGUAY 0.08 1 4.17 17.35 
PERU 0.12 0 3.90 15.18 
URUGUAY 0.04 0 4.21 17.73 
VENEZUELA 0.08 0 4.11 16.90 
ASIA
CHINA 0.00 0 3.84 14.72 
HONG KONG 1.00 0 4.20 17.65 
INDIA 0.00 0 3.78 14.29 
INDONESIA 0.81 0 3.75 14.08 
ISRAEL 0.23 0 4.28 18.29 
JAPAN 1.00 0 4.23 17.93 
JORDAN 1.00 1 3.88 15.05 
KOREA, SOUTH 0.88 0 4.01 16.09 
MALAYSIA 1.00 0 4.02 16.15 
PAKISTAN 0.00 0 3.79 14.35 
PHILIPPINES 0.12 0 4.00 15.97 
SINGAPORE 1.00 0 4.17 17.37 
SRI LANKA 0.23 0 4.15 17.19 
SYRIA 0.04 0 3.94 15.49 
TAIWAN 1.00 0 4.18 17.48 
THAILAND 1.00 0 3.99 15.88 
EUROPE
AUSTRIA 1.00 1 4.24 17.95 
BELGIUM 1.00 0 4.26 18.12 
DENMARK 1.00 0 4.28 18.34 
FINLAND 1.00 0 4.23 17.88 
FRANCE 1.00 0 4.26 18.15 
GERMANY, WEST 1.00 0 4.25 18.03 
GREECE 1.00 0 4.24 18.00 
IRELAND 0.96 0 4.25 18.07 
ITALY 1.00 0 4.25 18.03 
NETHERLANDS 1.00 0 4.29 18.41 
NORWAY 1.00 0 4.30 18.45 
PORTUGAL 1.00 0 4.17 17.37 
SPAIN 1.00 0 4.24 18.00 
SWEDEN 1.00 0 4.30 18.48 
SWITZERLAND 1.00 1 4.27 18.24 
TURKEY 0.08 0 3.95 15.58 
U.K. 1.00 0 4.26 18.17 
SOUTH PACIFIC
AUSTRALIA 1.00 0 4.26 18.17 
NEW ZEALAND 0.19 0 4.16 17.32 
COUNTRY TROPICS CGB7090 ICRGE80 GEA-GPOP
AFRICA
BOTSWANA 0.5 20.86 7.00 0.43 
BURKINA FASO 1.0 1.82 4.75 -0.14 
CAMEROON 1.0 5.56 5.66 -0.28 
CONGO 1.0 9.45 3.69 -0.22 
EGYPT 1.0 1.24 4.35 0.23 
GABON 1.0 16.21 5.38 -0.34 
GAMBIA 1.0 5.35 5.63 -0.11 
GHANA 1.0 -0.74 3.70 0.01 
IVORY COAST 1.0 5.27 6.70 -0.23 
KENYA 1.0 1.01 5.56 -0.05 
MADAGASCAR 0.9 3.18 4.67 -0.23 
MALAWI 1.0 1.94 4.47 -0.12 
MALI 1.0 6.37 3.00 -0.17 
MOROCCO 0.0 1.95 4.30 0.50 
NIGER 1.0 4.03 5.83 -0.15 
NIGERIA 1.0 6.04 3.08 0.02 
SENEGAL 1.0 1.20 4.75 -0.08 
SIERRA LEONE 1.0 -1.58 5.42 -0.16 
SOMALIA 1.0 1.33 3.73 -0.18 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.0 1.03 6.92 0.22 
TANZANIA 1.0 1.30 4.64 -0.03 
TUNISIA 0.0 7.48 4.59 0.57 
UGANDA 1.0 -1.45 2.97 -0.14 
ZAIRE 1.0 -0.00 2.98 -0.26 
ZAMBIA 1.0 -3.31 4.14 -0.18 
ZIMBABWE 1.0 -3.34 4.44 0.33 
NORTH AMERICA 
CANADA 0.0 -2.53 9.67 0.57 
COSTA RICA 1.0 0.78 5.47 0.76 
DOMINICAN REP. 1.0 5.09 4.52 0.73 
EL SALVADOR 1.0 1.84 2.58 0.17 
GUATEMALA 1.0 1.40 2.84 0.05 
HAITI 1.0 -4.72 2.58 0.08 
HONDURAS 1.0 2.95 3.39 0.14 
JAMAICA 1.0 -1.39 4.70 0.64 
MEXICO 0.5 -1.71 5.41 0.62 
NICARAGUA 1.0 -4.23 3.00 0.05 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 1.0 9.37 6.09 0.47 
U.S.A. 0.0 -1.61 9.80 0.36 
SOUTH AMERICA
ARGENTINA 0.0 -0.82 4.28 -0.15 
BOLIVIA 1.0 1.25 2.27 -0.07 
BRAZIL 0.5 -0.92 6.36 0.55 
CHILE 0.1 2.66 6.33 0.59 
COLOMBIA 1.0 2.09 5.30 0.74 
ECUADOR 1.0 1.55 5.42 0.45 
GUYANA 1.0 0.79 2.84 0.93 
PARAGUAY 0.5 2.62 4.40 0.59 
PERU 1.0 -0.17 3.23 0.44 
URUGUAY 0.0 -0.29 5.12 -0.07 
VENEZUELA 1.0 7.73 5.56 0.53 
ASIA
CHINA 0.1 0.43 5.69 0.80 
HONG KONG 0.0 3.60 8.02 0.84 
INDIA 0.5 0.20 5.76 0.20 
INDONESIA 1.0 8.21 3.67 0.31 
ISRAEL 0.0 -5.24 6.09 0.01 
JAPAN 0.0 -1.16 9.37 0.10 
JORDAN 0.0 -4.84 4.08 -0.07 
KOREA, SOUTH 0.0 3.20 6.36 1.03 
MALAYSIA 1.0 2.25 6.90 0.63 
PAKISTAN 0.0 0.24 4.11 0.14 
PHILIPPINES 1.0 2.04 2.97 0.36 
SINGAPORE 1.0 8.88 8.56 1.12 
SRI LANKA 1.0 1.81 4.33 0.48 
SYRIA 0.0 9.24 3.08 0.20 
TAIWAN 0.8 7.31 8.24 0.96 
THAILAND 1.0 1.34 6.26 0.87 
EUROPE
AUSTRIA 0.0 0.44 9.45 0.26 
BELGIUM 0.0 -2.64 9.71 0.20 
DENMARK 0.0 1.73 9.68 0.15 
FINLAND 0.0 3.81 9.68 0.14 
FRANCE 0.0 1.08 9.26 0.22 
GERMANY, WEST 0.0 1.04 9.59 0.26 
GREECE 0.0 -4.14 5.50 0.08 
IRELAND 0.0 -2.85 8.32 0.25 
ITALY 0.0 -3.77 8.20 0.18 
NETHERLANDS 0.0 0.76 9.81 0.41 
NORWAY 0.0 4.93 9.60 0.09 
PORTUGAL 0.0 -2.56 7.74 0.20 
SPAIN 0.0 0.88 7.64 0.17 
SWEDEN 0.0 1.90 9.65 -0.13 
SWITZERLAND 0.0 1.98 9.98 0.20 
TURKEY 0.0 2.12 5.26 0.50 
U.K. 0.0 0.90 9.34 0.03 
SOUTH PACIFIC
AUSTRALIA 0.1 1.59 9.43 0.32 
NEW ZEALAND 0.0 0.16 9.65 0.40 
COUNTRY SXP SSAFRICA ETHLING NS7089
AFRICA
BOTSWANA 0.05 1 51 8.11 
BURKINA FASO 0.04 1 68 2.64 
CAMEROON 0.18 1 89 4.59 
CONGO 0.08 1 66 -0.80 
EGYPT 0.07 0 4 -5.09 
GABON 0.33 1 69 46.16 
GAMBIA 0.36 1 73 -9.13 
GHANA 0.21 1 71 3.96 
IVORY COAST 0.29 1 86 -0.21 
KENYA 0.18 1 83 4.87 
MADAGASCAR 0.12 1 6 -4.92 
MALAWI 0.21 1 62 3.64 
MALI 0.08 1 78 14.21 
MOROCCO 0.11 0 53 2.07 
NIGER 0.05 1 73 11.10 
NIGERIA 0.14 1 87 11.12 
SENEGAL 0.14 1 75 -1.65 
SIERRA LEONE 0.09 1 77 -2.52 
SOMALIA 0.09 1 8 -1.94 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.17 1 88 10.71 
TANZANIA 0.17 1 93 4.07 
TUNISIA 0.10 0 16 8.39 
UGANDA 0.27 1 5.69 
ZAIRE 0.15 1 90 -1.39 
ZAMBIA 0.54 1 82 -0.49 
ZIMBABWE 0.17 1 54 11.53 
NORTH AMERICA 
CANADA 0.10 0 75 23.12 
COSTA RICA 0.19 0 7 9.62 
DOMINICAN REP. 0.13 0 4 11.66 
EL SALVADOR 0.16 0 17 1.51 
GUATEMALA 0.11 0 64 4.07 
HAITI 0.08 0 1 2.37 
HONDURAS 0.23 0 16 4.74 
JAMAICA 0.14 0 5 8.16 
MEXICO 0.02 0 30 14.04 
NICARAGUA 0.19 0 18 9.84 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 0.08 0 56 10.53 
U.S.A. 0.01 0 50 20.90 
SOUTH AMERICA
ARGENTINA 0.05 0 31 14.70 
BOLIVIA 0.18 0 68 10.50 
BRAZIL 0.05 0 7 14.98 
CHILE 0.15 0 14 -1.85 
COLOMBIA 0.09 0 6 12.85 
ECUADOR 0.11 0 53 17.41 
GUYANA 0.51 0 58 1.08 
PARAGUAY 0.10 0 14 12.97 
PERU 0.15 0 59 12.47 
URUGUAY 0.09 0 20 20.83 
VENEZUELA 0.24 0 11 29.81 
ASIA
CHINA 0.02 0 22.92 
HONG KONG 0.03 0 2 
INDIA 0.02 0 89 13.40 
INDONESIA 0.11 0 76 20.90 
ISRAEL 0.04 0 20 10.40 
JAPAN 0.01 0 1 34.14 
JORDAN 0.09 0 5 -8.81 
KOREA, SOUTH 0.02 0 0 23.38 
MALAYSIA 0.37 0 72 24.53 
PAKISTAN 0.03 0 64 7.52 
PHILIPPINES 0.13 0 74 14.48 
SINGAPORE 0.03 0 42 29.33 
SRI LANKA 0.15 0 47 8.00 
SYRIA 0.08 0 22 10.61 
TAIWAN 0.02 0 42 
THAILAND 0.09 0 66 15.07 
EUROPE
AUSTRIA 0.04 0 13 24.44 
BELGIUM 0.11 0 55 20.87 
DENMARK 0.10 0 5 19.90 
FINLAND 0.07 0 16 30.80 
FRANCE 0.03 0 26 25.75 
GERMANY, WEST 0.02 0 3 27.05 
GREECE 0.04 0 10 20.26 
IRELAND 0.15 0 4 17.06 
ITALY 0.02 0 4 24.89 
NETHERLANDS 0.15 0 10 24.77 
NORWAY 0.10 0 4 32.67 
PORTUGAL 0.05 0 1 14.42 
SPAIN 0.03 0 44 22.60 
SWEDEN 0.05 0 8 20.08 
SWITZERLAND 0.02 0 50 32.91 
TURKEY 0.04 0 25 18.05 
U.K. 0.03 0 32 18.65 
SOUTH PACIFIC
AUSTRALIA 0.10 0 32 23.48 
NEW ZEALAND 0.18 0 37 19.15 
COUNTRY LINV7089 INFL6590 G7089N
AFRICA
BOTSWANA -1.27 9.49 -0.05 
BURKINA FASO -2.10 5.08 -0.80 
CAMEROON -2.29 7.06 1.05 
CONGO -2.26 5.38 -0.42 
EGYPT -2.84 8.40 1.03 
GABON -1.31 8.66 2.53 
GAMBIA -2.51 9.99 -0.03 
GHANA -2.80 27.38 -0.19 
IVORY COAST -2.13 5.82 0.15 
KENYA -1.78 7.43 1.81 
MADAGASCAR -4.21 10.92 -3.36 
MALAWI -2.06 9.42 -0.77 
MALI -2.63 1.45 
MOROCCO -2.09 5.83 2.14 
NIGER -2.53 5.43 1.64 
NIGERIA -1.86 13.52 -0.21 
SENEGAL -1.57 5.77 1.49 
SIERRA LEONE -2.24 20.86 1.29 
SOMALIA -1.56 24.66 5.55 
SOUTH AFRICA -3.55 11.39 -1.17 
TANZANIA -1.56 13.57 -0.55 
TUNISIA -2.62 6.97 2.06 
UGANDA -2.78 0.30 
ZAIRE -1.59 0.22 
ZAMBIA -1.80 18.76 -1.20 
ZIMBABWE 7.89 -2.45 
NORTH AMERICA 
CANADA -1.33 6.02 1.76 
COSTA RICA -1.67 15.08 -1.33 
DOMINICAN REP. -1.65 11.75 0.00 
EL SALVADOR -2.38 9.95 0.35 
GUATEMALA -2.27 9.33 1.67 
HAITI -2.54 7.07 1.45 
HONDURAS -1.98 6.07 1.54 
JAMAICA -1.57 13.32 0.00 
MEXICO -1.70 26.79 1.66 
NICARAGUA -2.01 77.71 0.39 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO -1.94 9.26 -1.44 
U.S.A. -1.44 5.45 2.06 
SOUTH AMERICA
ARGENTINA -2.01 101.20 2.59 
BOLIVIA -1.79 54.80 1.59 
BRAZIL -1.54 76.53 -0.31 
CHILE -1.99 48.90 -0.94 
COLOMBIA -1.76 18.52 1.88 
ECUADOR -1.40 18.66 1.01 
GUYANA -1.58 14.99 2.11 
PARAGUAY -1.82 13.70 1.83 
PERU -1.62 68.71 1.64 
URUGUAY -1.67 46.87 1.87 
VENEZUELA -1.59 13.60 2.80 
ASIA
CHINA -1.76 2.21 3.12 
HONG KONG -1.52 7.57 3.49 
INDIA -1.72 7.73 3.04 
INDONESIA -1.49 29.78 2.37 
ISRAEL -1.34 41.02 2.76 
JAPAN -0.97 4.66 6.78 
JORDAN -1.58 1.20 
KOREA, SOUTH -1.22 12.43 3.31 
MALAYSIA -1.28 3.45 4.60 
PAKISTAN -2.22 8.05 2.63 
PHILIPPINES -1.74 11.48 5.19 
SINGAPORE -0.95 3.90 4.80 
SRI LANKA -1.65 9.93 2.27 
SYRIA -1.81 10.45 1.63 
TAIWAN -1.28 3.49 
THAILAND -1.63 5.29 4.59 
EUROPE
AUSTRIA -1.25 4.65 2.18 
BELGIUM -1.40 5.21 2.00 
DENMARK -1.29 7.34 2.03 
FINLAND -1.00 8.38 2.08 
FRANCE -1.23 7.06 2.21 
GERMANY, WEST -1.25 3.90 1.93 
GREECE -1.32 12.52 1.98 
IRELAND -1.24 8.95 2.20 
ITALY -1.26 10.24 1.95 
NETHERLANDS -1.38 4.83 2.13 
NORWAY -1.08 6.76 2.02 
PORTUGAL -1.38 13.21 1.99 
SPAIN -1.28 10.52 1.62 
SWEDEN -1.39 7.55 2.02 
SWITZERLAND -1.15 4.42 2.20 
TURKEY -1.39 28.89 -0.41 
U.K. -1.60 8.58 2.04 
SOUTH PACIFIC
AUSTRALIA -1.20 7.86 4.75 
NEW ZEALAND -1.32 9.58 
